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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the last two decades, a number of countries have reformed their patent systems in
order to strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights (hereinafter, IPRs).
Such reforms are often justiﬁed by the view that stronger IPR protection should
enhance economic growth by increasing the returns to innovation and, hence, the in-
centives to innovate. However, the relationship between IPR protection and growth
is not as clear as is widely believed.1 Figure 1 illustrates a scatter plot of the av-
erage growth rate and the level of IPR protection, using Rapp and Rozek’s (1990)
cross-country data on the level of patent protection. Although there is substan-
tial variability across countries in both the level of IPR protection and the rate of
economic growth, it is diﬃcult to determine a clear relationship between these two
variables in the ﬁgure.2
Given that stronger IPRs unambiguously provide greater incentives to innovate,
the weak relationship observed between IPR protection and the rate of economic
growth suggests that IPRs may have negative eﬀects on economic growth. A well-
known drawback of stronger IPRs is that they provide innovators with longer periods
of monopoly on average and, therefore, tend to increase the number of monopolistic
sectors within the whole economy. In the light of this tendency, earlier studies
have demonstrated that consumer welfare is not necessarily improved when IPRs are
strengthened, because consumers then face higher prices.3 In this paper, we present
1Applications for patents in the United States have increased drastically since 1985; however,
there is little evidence that this increase was caused by the strengthening of IPR protection. Changes
in the management of R&D and the shift to more applied activities seem to have spurred patenting
(Kortum and Lerner, 1998).
2Gould and Gruben (1996) ran regressions using the index by Rapp and Rozek (1990) and the
average growth rate between 1960 and 1988. They found a positive but weak relationship between
IPR protection and economic growth (see Table 2 of their paper). In addition, they pointed out
that, on average, countries with level ‘three’ IPR protection grew more slowly than those with
weaker (level ‘two’) IPR protection.
3Using endogenous growth models, Futagami, Mino, and Ohkusa (1999), Kwan and Lai (2003),
2Figure 1: Average per capita growth rate 1960—2000 and the level of patent pro-
tection. The horizontal axis ranks the level of patent protection from one to six, where one
corresponds to nations with no patent protection law and higher numbers indicate countries with
patent laws that are more consistent with the minimum standards proposed by the United States
Chamber of Commerce (1987). The average growth rate is taken from Heston et al. (2002).
a mechanism through which stronger IPRs negatively aﬀect the long-term rate of
economic growth, by focusing on the following two properties of R&D.
The ﬁrst property is the diﬀerence in the environments for R&D provided by
monopolistic and competitive sectors. In a monopolistic sector, where an incumbent
holds the exclusive right to produce a state-of-the-art good, the incumbent has lit-
tle incentive to further improve the product because it can secure monopoly proﬁts
without such eﬀorts (the Arrow eﬀect, 1962). Thus, in monopolistic sectors, innova-
and Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) showed that consumer welfare is maximized when protection
of IPRs (achieved by, for example, increasing the diﬃculty of imitation, and providing longer and
broader patents) is at an intermediate strength, rather than when it is at its strongest. However,
all three studies found that strengthening IPRs always enhances economic growth. In addition,
Grossman and Lai (2004) found that stronger IPRs were not necessarily welfare enhancing in a
nonendogenous growth model.
3tive eﬀorts are made only by outside ﬁrms, which can succeed only when they create
a good of higher quality than the incumbent’s. Such leapfrogging innovations are
more diﬃcult to achieve than innovations in competitive sectors because the outside
ﬁr m sh a v en oe x p e r i e n c ei np r o d u c i n gs t a t e - of-the-art-quality goods. In addition,
production of a new superior good often involves a similar process to the production
of the current state-of-the-art goods and, therefore, the incumbent’s IPRs may result
in the production of the new superior goods being banned. Thus, ceteris paribus,i t
is more diﬃcult for outside ﬁrms to invent new high quality goods in monopolistic
s e c t o r st h a ni ti si nc o m p e t i t i v es e c t ors. Empirical studies by Blundell et al. (1995)
and Nickel (1996) have shown that innovation is less active in more concentrated
sectors.
The second property of R&D projects is that they take time and their outcomes
(successes or failures) are revealed only after the projects are completed. This means
that individual innovators must initiate R&D projects without knowing whether
other innovators’ projects will eventually succeed or fail. Thus, there is a nonnegli-
gible probability that more than two innovators may independently succeed in inno-
vating the same intermediate good of the same quality. Given the nonrivalry of the
knowledge obtained by innovation, this duplication of innovations is not only futile
from the viewpoint of economic growth, but also reduces the proﬁts and incentives
of innovators.4 We show that the duplication of innovations is more likely to occur
when there are fewer competitive sectors in an economy.
Incorporating these two properties of R&D explicitly into the quality-ladder
model of endogenous growth, this paper reexamines the relation between IPR pro-
tection and economic growth. We assume that innovations are imitated over time
and that strengthening IPR protection reduces the probability of imitation. On
the balanced growth path (BGP), stronger IPR protection increases the number of
monopolistic sectors in which the state-of-t h e - a r tq u a l i t yg o o d sh a v en o ty e tb e e n
imitated. Conversely, it reduces the number of competitive sectors in which the
4Jones (1995) incorporated the possibility of duplication into his model.
4state-of-the-art quality goods have already been imitated and any ﬁrm can produce
them. As innovation is assumed to be more diﬃcult in monopolistic sectors, R&D is
more concentrated in competitive sectors. The stronger IPR protection is, the fewer
competitive sectors there will be and, therefore, the more researchers will engage in
R&D in each competitive sector. However, when the time required to innovate is
explicitly considered, the possibility of duplication of innovations increases with the
number of researchers in the ﬁeld, thereby reducing the expected return on R&D.5
As a result, strengthening IPR protection does not necessarily facilitate economic
growth. This paper examines the relative signiﬁcance of the growth-enhancing and
-reducing eﬀects of IPRs and shows that the long-term growth rate is maximized by
imperfect, rather than the perfect, protection of IPRs.
In the literature on IPR protection, most theoretical studies have concluded that
stronger protection always enhances economic growth.6 However, a few studies have
pointed out that IPRs have negative eﬀects on growth for various reasons. Helpman
(1993) instigated the examination of the eﬀects of tightening IPRs in the framework
of a North—South economy. He showed that strengthening IPR protection (i.e.,
reducing the probability of imitation) in the South reduces the rate of innovation
in the north in the long run. His result depended critically on the assumption that
there was no movement of labor between the two countries, or, equivalently, between
the monopolistic and competitive sectors. This paper considers a closed economy
model without any restriction on the movement of workers across sectors.
Michel and Nyssen (1998) examined the impact of IPRs on growth in terms
of patent length and found that the rate of economic growth is maximized when
the patent length is ﬁnite, rather than inﬁnite. In a variety-expansion model of
endogenous growth, they assumed that the knowledge spillover from past R&D is
5This mechanism is consistent with ﬁndings by Kortum (1993) and Thompson (1996), who
reported that the rate of return from R&D diminishes as the number of researchers increases.
6In addition to the studies mentioned in footnote 3, O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) showed
that stronger patent protection enhances innovation and economic growth.
5limited during the term of patent protection. Based on this assumption, extending
patent length reduces the knowledge spillover and, therefore, lowers the productivity
of present R&D. The mechanism in their model is similar to our model, in which
IPR protection prevents outside ﬁrms from obtaining experience in the production of
state-of-the-art-quality goods. However, whereas Michel and Nyssen considered only
the creation of new goods as an engine of growth, in our model, growth is driven by
two types of innovation in existing sectors: leapfrogging in monopolistic sectors, and
innovation after imitation in competitive sectors. We show that IPR policies aﬀect
the signiﬁcance of these two sources of growth diﬀerently.
Finally, using models of step-by-step innovation, Aghion, Harris, and Vickers
(1997) and Mukoyama (2003) showed that the growth rate increases with the ease
of imitation or the rate of subsidy on imitation. In their models, two ﬁrms operate
in each sector, and innovation is assumed to take place only in the “competitive”
sector, where the two ﬁrms share the same level of technology.7 T h er a t eo fe c o n o m i c
growth clearly increases with the number of competitive sectors because the number
of ﬁrms exerting eﬀorts to innovate in each sector is ﬁxed.8 Our model does not
rely on this mechanism as we allow the free entry of innovative activity in any
sector, as is commonly assumed in other R&D-based endogenous growth models.
Rather, in our model, where the time required to innovate is explicitly introduced,
widespread competition promotes growth by diversifying researchers across broader
ﬁelds, thereby reducing the possibility of unnecessary duplication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 explains how tightening patent protection aﬀects the growth rate, assuming that
leapfrogging is prohibitively diﬃcult. Section 4 derives the BGP in a general setting
7Aghion et al. (2001) found their result was robust even when the monopolist is allowed to carry
out R&D.
8In particular, Aghion et al. (1997) assumed decreasing returns to individual R&D inputs by
each ﬁrm, whereas, in the model of Mukoyama (2003), the level of R&D input is determined by
the Nash equilibrium in the innovation race, which is independent of the number of competitive
sectors.
6and examines the relative importance of leapfrogging and innovation after imitation.
Section 5 investigates an extended version of the model, in which strengthening
IPRs not only reduces the imitation rate but also raises the diﬃculty of leapfrogging
innovation. Section 6 concludes the paper. An appendix provides the proof of
lemmas.
2M o d e l
This section sets up a discrete-time version of a quality-ladder model based on Gross-
man and Helpman (1991b). After describing households and production sectors in
the ﬁrst subsection, we explain how the environments for R&D diﬀer between com-
petitive and monopolistic sectors in the second subsection. The ﬁnal subsection
considers the evolution of the value of innovation and the number of monopolistic
sectors in the economy, allowing for the possibility of imitation.
2.1 Households and production technologies
We consider a closed economy consisting of homogeneous and inﬁnitely lived house-
holds of size L. Each household is endowed with a unit of labor in each period.
The nominal market value of labor (i.e., the wage) is denoted by wt,w h i c hi st ob e







where β ∈ (0,1) is a constant subjective discount factor and ct is consumption of the
ﬁnal good in period t. Each household maximizes (1) subject to the intertemporal
budget constraint at+1 − at = rtat + wt − Ptct,w h e r eat denotes the per capita
nominal ﬁnancial asset,9 rt is the interest rate, and Pt is the price of the ﬁnal good,
9T h ei n i t i a lv a l u eo fa0 is determined by the initial value of IPRs: a0 = µ0V0/L,w h e r et h e
deﬁnitions of µ0 and V0 are given later. In fact, we do not need to keep track of the consumer’s
budget constraint thanks to Walras’s law.
7which is normalized so that the aggregate consumption expenditure becomes unity
at each period: PtctL =1f o ra l lt. This is a standard dynamic optimization problem,
with its Euler equation being (Pt+1ct+1)/(Ptct)=β(1 + rt+1). Note that, under our
normalization of Pt, the left-hand side (LHS) of the Euler equation equals one for all
t.T h e n ,1 = β(1 + rt) must hold for all periods, implying that the interest rate is
constant at rt = β−1 − 1 ≡ r.
The ﬁnal good is produced competitively using a continuum of diﬀerent types
of intermediate goods, indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. We consider a standard quality-ladder
setting, where each type of intermediate good potentially has several quality grades
as a result of past product innovations. The quality grades of a given type of inter-
mediate good, indexed by integers j ≥ 0, are perfectly substitutable as inputs to the
production of the ﬁnal good, and have diﬀerent marginal productivities. For each i
and j,l e t˜ xit(j) denote the units of the type i intermediate good of quality j,w h i c h
a r eu s e di nt h eﬁnal-good production. Then, the output Yt is determined by the
following production function:













where λ > 1 represents the size of the quality improvement obtained from one inno-
vation and qit ≥ 0 is the highest (state-of-the-art) quality of the type i intermediate
good (i.e., it represents the cumulative innovations that have occurred in sector i
by date t). As the intermediate goods of the same type are perfect substitutes, the
ﬁnal good producers use the single quality that has the lowest quality-adjusted price,
˜ pit(j)/λj, for every type of intermediate good.
Each type of intermediate good is produced in a separate intermediate good
sector. In every sector, production of one unit of the intermediate good of any
quality requires one unit of labor, which means that the marginal cost of production
equals the nominal wage, wt. As the costs are the same for all qualities, only the
state-of-the-art technology is used in equilibrium. Let xit ≡ ˜ xit(qit)a n dpit ≡ ˜ pit(qit)
denote the amount and price of the state-of-the-art good in sector i.N o t e t h a t
the market value of total output from the ﬁnal good production equals one because
8ﬁnal goods are used only for consumption and we have normalized the aggregate
consumption expenditure to one. In addition, the production function of the ﬁnal
good is a symmetric Cobb—Douglas function and the total number of sectors is one.
Hence, the expenditure of the ﬁnal good producers on each type of intermediate good
is also one, implying that the demand function for each type of intermediate good is
xit =1 /pit.
The equilibrium prices and quantities in the intermediate good sectors depend
on whether they are monopolistic or competitive. An intermediate good sector is
monopolistic when there is a ﬁrm that holds an IPR giving it the exclusive right
to produce the highest-quality intermediate goods. A monopoly ﬁrm maximizes its
proﬁt by employing the limit-pricing strategy; that is, it sets a price that cannot
be undercut by the next-best-quality good in terms of the quality-adjusted price.
This price is10 pit = λwt. Given the demand function xit =1 /pit, the monopoly
ﬁrm sells amount xit =1 /(λwt), obtaining the monopoly proﬁt π =( λ − 1)/λ.I na
competitive sector, where the technology to produce the highest-quality intermediate
good is publicly available, ﬁrms compete with each other, pushing the price down to
the marginal cost, pit = wt.I nt h i sc a s e ,xit =1 /wt.
2.2 R&D and the labor market equilibrium
In the model, economic growth is driven by innovations, which raise the quality of
intermediate goods. Innovation may occur in competitive and monopolistic sectors as
a result of R&D activities by workers. However, the environments for such activities
are diﬀerent depending upon whether R&D is undertaken in a competitive or a
monopolistic sector.
10The quality-adjusted price of the monopoly ﬁrm is (λwt)/λqit = wt/λqit−1. Recall that the
marginal cost of producing any intermediate good is wt. Thus, producers of the next-best-quality
good can only set ˜ pit(qit −1) ≥ wt,w h e r e˜ pit(qit −1) denotes the price of the intermediate good of
quality qit − 1. Their quality-adjusted price must be ˜ pit(qit − 1)/λqit−1 ≥ wt/λqit−1. Hence, they
cannot undercut the quality-adjusted price of the monopolist.
9Let us start by describing the environment for R&D in competitive sectors. When
one worker conducts an R&D activity for one period in a particular competitive sector
i, he or she has a small probability, b a>0, of successfully creating an innovated good.
Any R&D activity takes one period to be completed. Hence, the innovated interme-
diate good can be produced only from the next period onwards. We assume away
interaction between researchers. Then, given that the total number of researchers in
the competitive sector is nit, the probability that some of them successfully innovate
is:11
G(nit)=1− (1 − b a)
nit =1− exp(−anit), (3)
where a ≡−ln(1−b a). As a ' b a,g i v e nt h a tb a is suﬃciently small, we use parameter
a interchangeably with b a in the following. Let Vt+1 denote the value of monopolizing
this innovation at period t + 1. Note that this value must be discounted by β =
1/(1 + r) because the fruits from the innovation can be reaped only in the next
period, whereas the costs of the innovation must be incurred immediately. Then, the








with g0(·) < 0, g(0) = a, and limn→∞ g(n)=0 .
Equation (4) implies that the payoﬀ per worker decreases as the total number
of researchers competing with each other in the sector increases. This is due to
the possibility of duplication; even when two workers simultaneously innovate in the
same sector, their total payoﬀ is at most βVt+1,r a t h e rt h a n2 βVt+1, because of the
nonrival nature of knowledge. We may assume that successful innovators share the
proﬁts from the innovation, βVt+1, equally because they fear entering into Bertrand
competition from the next period onwards and ending up with zero proﬁts if they
11The probability that one researcher fails is 1−b a. Assuming that there is no correlation between
the successes or failures of innovation among the researchers, the probability that all nit researchers
simultaneously fail is (1 − b a)nit. From this, we obtain (3). If there is a positive correlation, the
possibility of duplication increases and thus, function g(·) decreases with nit more rapidly than in
(4). This change would strengthen the growth-reducing eﬀect of stronger IPRs.
10fail to agree upon a division of proﬁts. Alternatively, we can consider the case where
one lucky innovator obtains the sole right to use that innovation, while others are
prohibited. In either case, the expected return from engaging in R&D activities in
sector i is βVt+1g(nit).
Innovation may also occur in monopolistic sectors. As the incumbent monopo-
list has little incentive to innovate in its own sector (the Arrow eﬀect), any R&D
that occurs is carried out by outsiders who try to leapfrog the current monopolist.
However, in contrast to ﬁrms in competitive sectors, outside ﬁrms in monopolistic
sectors cannot gain experience in producing goods with state-of-the-art technology.
This limits the ﬁrms’ ability to attain the information required to improve upon the
current state-of-the-art technology. In addition, outside researchers must restrict
their methods of innovation to avoid infringing the patents of the incumbent ﬁrm.
For these reasons, the probability that an outside researcher in a monopolistic sector
will succeed, denoted by b b ∈ (0,b a), is well below the probability of success in a com-
petitive sector. We treatb b as an exogenously given parameter, until it is endogenized
in section 5. Let mit denote the total number of researchers in monopolistic sector
i. Then, the probability that at least one of the researchers succeeds is:
H(mit)=1− (1 −b b)
mit =1− exp(−bmit), (5)
where b ≡− ln(1 − b b) ' b. The expected payoﬀ that each researcher receives is
βVt+1h(mit). Here, h(mit) ≡ H(mit)/mit,w i t hh0(·) < 0, h(0) = b,a n dl i m m→∞ h(m)=
0.
The number of researchers in each sector, competitive or monopolistic, is deter-
mined by the free-entry condition. We assume a complete insurance market so that
the risk of engaging in R&D activities can be fully diversiﬁed. Workers compare the
expected return from engaging in R&D for one period with the payoﬀ from working
as a production worker for that period, wt. There are two conditions that must
be satisﬁed in equilibrium: (i) the expected payoﬀ from R&D should not exceed the
market wage in equilibrium, and (ii) R&D sho u l dp r o v i d ea ne x p e c t e dr e t u r na tl e a s t
11equal to wt when some workers engage in R&D.12 These requirements determine nit
and mit as follows:13




g−1(wt/βVt+1)i f wt/βVt+1 <a ,
0i f wt/βVt+1 ≥ a,
(6)




h−1(wt/βVt+1)i f wt/βVt+1 <b ,
0i f wt/βVt+1 ≥ b.
(7)
Equations (6) and (7) show that the number of researchers in each sector is deter-
mined by wt/βVt+1, which represents the cost of R&D relative to the discounted
value of innovation that a researcher can obtain if he or she succeeds. Researchers
participate in R&D activities in competitive sectors when this relative cost is lower
than the probability of success, a, and they carry out R&D in monopolistic sectors if
the relative cost is lower than the probability of success there, b. Observe that, given
the discounted value of innovation, βVt+1, the number of researchers in every com-
petitive or monopolistic sector, is a decreasing function of the market wage. That is,
if the cost of R&D rises, the number of R&D competitors must decrease so that the
reduced possibility of duplication compensates for the rise in the R&D cost.
The equilibrium market wage at each period is determined so that the aggregate
labor demand for both production and R&D is equalized to the aggregate labor
supply. Recall that the demand for production workers in each intermediate good
sector is determined by the amount of sales, which is 1/wt in the competitive sectors
and 1/(λwt) in the monopolistic sectors. Let µt denote the number of monopolistic
12In mathematical terms, βVt+1g(nit) ≤ wt with equality when nit > 0 for all competitive
intermediate good sectors, and βVt+1h(mit) ≤ wt with equality when mit > 0 for all monopolistic
sectors.
13As expression wt/βVt+1 appears frequently, to minimize notations, we write it this way rather
than wt/(βVt+1).
12sectors in the economy. Then, labor market clearing requires that:14
(1 − πµt)/wt +( 1− µt)N(wt/βVt+1)+µtM(wt/βVt+1)=L. (8)
The LHS of (8) gives the aggregate labor demand, with the ﬁrst term representing the
number of production workers and the second and third terms representing the total
number of researchers in the competitive and the monopolistic sectors, respectively.
It is easily conﬁrmed that the aggregate labor demand is downward sloping with
respect to wt, and that it increases unboundedly when wt → 0, and shrinks toward
zero as wt →∞ . Those properties guarantee that, given µt and Vt+1, there exists a
unique level of wt at which the aggregate labor demand coincides with the aggregate
labor supply, L. Once the equilibrium value of wt is obtained, nt and mt are found
from (6) and (7).
2.3 Evolution of the economy
The state of the economy is characterized by the number of monopolistic sectors,
µt, and the value of innovation, Vt. This subsection describes the evolution of the
economy over time.
There are two reasons why a ﬁrm’s monopoly in a particular intermediate good
sector ends. The ﬁrst is leapfrogging. If a successful innovation occurs in a mo-
nopolistic sector, the incumbent monopolist is replaced by the successful innovator
in the following period. As shown by (5), leapfrogging occurs with a probability of
H(mt) during each period. The second cause is imitation. Even though the IPRs
of a monopoly ﬁrm are protected to a certain extent, other ﬁrms may ﬁnd a diﬀer-
ent method of producing goods similar to the monopolist’s without infringing upon
the monopolist’s patent. We assume that such imitation occurs with a constant
probability of δ ∈ [0,1] in each period and that it allows any ﬁrm to produce the
state-of-the-art-quality intermediate good from the next period onwards. Param-
14Recall that π =( λ−1)/λ. The total number of production workers is (1−µt)/wt+µt/(λwt)=
(1 − µt + µt/λ)/wt =( 1− πµt)/wt.
13eter δ measures the weakness of IPR protection; in an economy with strong IPR
protection, δ is close to zero and imitation rarely occurs, whereas, with weak IPR
protection, δ is large and imitation is frequent.
If imitation occurs, it turns a monopolistic sector into a competitive one. A
subtle point is that both leapfrogging and imitation may occur simultaneously within
one period. In this case, a new monopoly ﬁrm emerges in the following period
and the imitation of the current state-of-the-art product has no impact on the new
monopolist. Without a systematic correlation between these two types of event, the
coincidence occurs with a probability of δH(mt). Thus, the number of monopolistic
sectors that change to competitive ones in the following period is δ(1 − H(mt))µt.
On the other hand, out of 1 − µt competitive intermediate good sectors, G(nt)(1 −
µt) sectors develop into monopolistic ones through successful innovations. The net
change in µt for one period is determined by the diﬀerence between these two ﬂows:
µt+1 − µt =( 1− µt)G(nt) − δµt(1 − H(mt)). (9)
Next, let us examine how the value of innovation evolves over time. Recall that Vt
represents the value of holding a valid (not imitated) IPR at period t.I fam o n o p o l y
ﬁr mh o l d st h i sr i g h t ,i te a r n sap r o ﬁto fπ =( λ − 1)/λ. In addition, this IPR is
still valid at period t + 1 if neither imitation nor leapfrogging has occurred during
period t. Its present value is βVt+1, and this value is realized with a probability of
(1 − δ)(1 − H(mt)). In sum, Vt is determined by a backward dynamics, as follows:
Vt = π + β(1 − δ)(1 − H(mt))Vt+1, (10)
together with a transversality condition, limT→∞ βTVT =0 , which is required for
ruling out bubble prices.
The equilibrium dynamics is characterized by equations (9) and (10). Once nt
and mt are eliminated by (6), (7), and (8), we see that they constitute an autonomous
system of diﬀerence equations in terms of µt and Vt.15 The initial number of mo-
nopolistic sectors, µ0, is historically given, whereas the initial value of an IPR, V0,
15Let us deﬁne function W(µt,V t+1) as the equilibrium level of wt given µt and Vt+1, as deter-
14is determined so that the transversality condition is not violated. Along the equilib-
rium path, the growth rate of output is obtained by taking the diﬀerence in the log
of Yt.F r o m( 2 ) ,i ti s :
γYt+1 ≡ lnYt+1 − lnYt =( l nλ)
Z 1
0
(qit+1 − qit)di +
Z 1
0
(lnxit+1 − lnxit)di. (11)
Equation (11) shows that the growth rate can be decomposed into changes in qualities
and changes in quantities. On the right-hand side (RHS) of (11), the integral in the
ﬁrst term corresponds to the total number of sectors in which innovation occurs at
period t. It is the sum of the number of leapfroggings, µtH(mt), and the number
of innovations in the competitive sectors, (1 − µt)G(nt). The second term is the
aggregate change of (the log of) output in the intermediate good sectors. Recall
that the intermediate good output is 1/(λwt) in a monopolistic sector, and 1/wt in
a competitive sector. By substituting these quantities into (11), the growth rate can
be expressed as:
γYt+1 =( l nλ)[(1−µt)G(nt)+µtH(mt)]−(lnλ)(µt+1 −µt)−(lnwt+1 −lnwt). (12)
The growth eﬀects of IPR policies can be understood by examining how changes
in δ aﬀect the endogenous variables in expression (12). The following three sections
are devoted to this task, starting from a special but still informative case, moving
toward a general setting, and then on to a more realistic extension.
3 Growth without leapfrogging
This section examines the growth eﬀects of IPR policies by focusing on an extreme
case in which leapfrogging is prohibitively diﬃcult. Note that, from (8) and (10),
there is a lower bound for the cost of R&D relative to the discounted value of inno-



















wt/βVt+1 ≥ r/((λ − 1)L) ≡ z
min. (13)
As a benchmark, this section considers a case in which the probability of successful
leapfrogging, b, is even lower than this lower bound:
Assumption 1. b<z min.
Under Assumption 1, (7) and (13) imply that mt =0f o ra l lt;t h a ti s ,n o
researchers operate in the monopolistic sectors and, therefore, leapfrogging never
occurs. Without the risk of being leapfrogged, the value of an innovation is inﬂuenced
only by the probability of being imitated, which is directly controlled by IPR policies.
Substituting mt =0f o ra l lt into (10) and then applying the transversality condition,
we ﬁnd that the value of innovation is constant over time:
Vt =
π
1 − β(1 − δ)
≡ V (δ)f o r a l l t. (14)
The number of researchers in each competitive sector, nt, is determined by the
free-entry condition (6) and the labor-market-clearing condition (8). Given that
mt =0a n dVt = V (δ)f o ra l lt, these conditions can be restated as follows:
1 − πµt
L − (1 − µt)nt
≥ βV (δ)g(nt), with equality if nt > 0. (15)
Condition (15) has an intuitive interpretation. The LHS of (15) represents the pro-
duction workers’ wage. Note that the number of production workers, L − (1 − µt)nt
in the denominator, decreases as nt rises. Then, the nominal wage that each produc-
tion worker receives increases because the total aggregate consumption expenditure
is normalized to unity. Hence, the production workers’ wage is upward sloping, as
shown by Figure 2. The RHS of (15) is the expected payoﬀ of R&D in the competitive
16Note that, from (8), the equilibrium wage cannot be lower than (1−π)/L as otherwise the labor
demand for production, (1−πµt)/wt, exceeds the labor supply, L. Note also that Vt+1 ≤ π/(1−β)=
(λ − 1)/(λ(1 − β)) from (10) and the transversality condition. Therefore, using r = β−1 − 1a n d
π ≡ (λ − 1)/λ,w eh a v ewt/βVt+1 ≥ r/((λ − 1)L) ≡ zmin.
16Figure 2: Determination of nt and wt when R&D occurs only in competitive sectors.
The dashed curve at the bottom of the ﬁgure shows that there is no interior solution when IPR
protection is too weak (δ ≥ δ(0)). The expected payoﬀ of R&D shifts up as δ decreases toward 0,
and the wage for production shifts down as µ increases toward 1. The result of both changes is an
increase of nt toward nmax ≡ g−1(zmin).
sectors. It is downward sloping with respect to nt because of the increasing possibil-
ity of duplication. If IPR protection is very weak, or if the possibility of imitation
δ is very high, the expected payoﬀ of R&D is lower than the wage for any positive
value of nt. Therefore, no worker engages in R&D (i.e., nt = 0). A straightforward





gives the level of IPR protection required to activate R&D activities. Observe from
(16) that if a ≤ r/(πL), no R&D occurs regardless of the degree of IPR protection,
which means that growth is not possible. Conversely, if a ≥ (1+r)/(πL), innovation
is so easy that R&D take place without any IPR protection. Therefore, the realistic
17Note that δ ≥ δ(µt)i se q u i v a l e n tt o( 1− πµt)/L ≥ aβV (δ)=βV (δ)g(0). As function g(nt)i s
strictly decreasing with respect to nt, the above inequality implies that (1−πµt)/(L−(1−µt)nt) ≥
(1 − πµt)/L > βV (δ)g(nt) for all nt > 0.
17case is:
r/(πL) <a<(1 + r)/(πL), (17)
so that δ(0) ≡ aπL − r ∈ (0,1). We assume (17) throughout the paper.
Under (17), R&D takes place provided that IPR protection is reasonably tight.18
When δ < δ(µt), there exists a unique interior intersection between the two curves
depicted in Figure 2 because the expected return from R&D is higher than the
production workers’ wage when nt = 0, and it converges to zero as n →∞ .A tt h e
intersecting point, workers are indiﬀerent between these two types of activity and,
thus, the free-entry condition for R&D is satisﬁed. In addition, Figure 2 shows the
eﬀect of IPR policies on R&D activities. When IPR protection is strengthened, the
probability of imitation δ falls towards zero and, as a result, the value of innovation
V (δ) in (14) rises. The curve that corresponds to the expected payoﬀ of R&D shifts
up, increasing both wt and nt in equilibrium. As wt is inversely related to the number
of production workers, this means that stronger IPRs cause a reallocation of labor
from production to R&D.
Although such a reallocation directly enhances economic growth by increasing the
rate of innovation in each competitive sector, it also indirectly aﬀects the long-term
rate of economic growth by changing the evolution of the number of monopolistic
sectors. Let ψ(µt,δ) denote the equilibrium number of researchers in each competitive
sector, determined by condition (15). By substituting nt = ψ(µt,δ)a n dmt =0f o r
(9), we obtain the following changes in µt:
µt+1 − µt = −δµt +( 1− µt)G(ψ(µt,δ)). (18)
Once µ0 is given by the initial condition, the subsequent evolution of µt is determined
by (18). The pattern of evolution is dependent on the weakness of IPR protection,
δ, and so is the long-term value of µt. The following lemma states this dependence.
Lemma 1. For every δ ∈ [0,1], there exists a ﬁxed point of (18). Suppose that the
18Note that, because δ
0
(µt) > 0, (17) implies δ(µt) ≥ δ(0) > 0 for all µt ∈ [0,1].
18ﬁxed point is unique,19 and let it be denoted by µ∗(δ).T h e n ,µt converges to µ∗(δ)
from any initial µ0. In addition, µ∗(δ) satisﬁes: (i) µ∗(δ) > 0 and µ∗0(δ) < 0 for
δ < δ(0), (ii) µ∗(0) = 1, and (iii) µ∗(δ)=0for δ ≥ δ(0).
Proof: see the Appendix.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward. As explained above, stronger
IPR protection increases the number of researchers and, therefore, the ﬂow of inno-
vation. In addition, it reduces the ﬂow of imitation. For every given µt,b o t ho ft h e s e
changes imply that more sectors change from being competitive to being monopolis-
tic than vice versa. Provided that the ﬁxed point is unique, these changes also imply
an increase in the level to which µt converges in the long run (hence, µ∗0(δ) < 0).
As shown by Figure 2, the curve representing the market wage shifts down as the
equilibrium number of monopolistic sectors increases over time (see the LHS of equa-
tion 15). This shift further increases the number of researchers in each competitive
sector, nt, but this increase is not growth enhancing. To see why, note that more
researchers operate in each competitive sector simply because they are concentrated
in a smaller number of competitive sectors. In fact, the aggregate number of re-
searchers, (1−µt)nt, tends to decrease as IPR protection becomes very tight (δ → 0)
because the number of competitive sectors where R&D is carried out becomes van-
ishingly small (µ∗(δ) → 1 from Lemma 1), whereas the number of researchers per
sector is bounded by a ﬁnite number, nmax ≡ g−1(zmin), from (6) and (13).20 This
tendency can be conﬁrmed from the fall in the market wage in ﬁgure 2, which implies
a reallocation of workers from R&D activities to production, given our normalization
of prices. In addition, as more researchers operate in the same intermediate good
sector, the risk of duplication rises. That is, as the number of competitive sectors
19We have experimented with various combinations of parameters and found that (18) has an
unique ﬁxed point for every combination of parameters we have chosen.
20Note that such a bound exists because of the possibility of duplication. That is, if more than
nmax researchers operate in a sector, the probability that duplication will occur is so high that the
expected return is below the lowest possible wage.
19decreases, research must be carried out in a narrower range of ﬁelds, which causes
more duplication and reduces the ﬂow of innovation, net of duplication.21
The long-term rate of growth under a given strength of IPR protection, denoted
by γ∗
Y(δ) ≡ (lnYt+1 − lnYt)∗, is obtained by substituting µt = µt+1 = µ∗(δ), wt+1 =
wt,a n dmt = 0 into (12):
γ
∗




where n∗(δ) ≡ ψ(µ∗(δ),δ) and, therefore, n∗(δ)g(n∗(δ)) ≡ G(ψ(µ∗(δ),δ)). The RHS
of equation (19) suggests that there are three ways in which IPR protection aﬀects
the rate of long-term growth. First, in the long run, stronger protection reduces the
number of competitive sectors, (1 − µ∗(δ)). Protection should be not so strict that
it shuts out all imitation because, in that case, the ﬂow of imitations vanishes, all
sectors become monopolistic in the long run (µ∗(0) = 1 from Lemma 1), and R&D
becomes impossible. Second, as we saw above, stronger IPR protection (smaller δ)
increases the number of researchers in each competitive sector, n∗(δ), directly and
indirectly. In particular, protection must be stronger than δ(0) because, otherwise,
no one will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to participate in R&D activities. This can be conﬁrmed
by: n∗(δ(0)) = ψ(µ∗(δ(0)),δ(0)) = ψ(0,δ(0)) = 0 from Lemma 1 and the deﬁnition
of δ(·). Third, stronger protection (a larger δ) raises the risk of duplication, which
lowers g(n∗(δ)) (recall that g0(n) < 0).
Growth is enhanced by stronger IPR protection through the second term, but is
inhibited through the ﬁrst and third terms of (19). The overall eﬀect of stronger IPRs
on growth can be either positive or negative depending on the relative magnitude
of these three eﬀects. In particular, the above analysis implies that the relationship
between IPR protection and growth is nonmonotonic, as summarized below.
Proposition 1. Under assumption 1, protection of IPRs should be neither too strict
(δ =0 )n o rt o ol o o s e( δ ≥ δ(0)) because, in either case, the resulting long-term rate of
21If the total number of researchers is denoted by R, the aggregate ﬂow of innovation (net of
duplication) is (1 − µ)G(R/(1 − µ)). From (3) we can conﬁrm that this expression decreases as
(1 − µ) falls.
20growth would be zero. There exists a noncorner level of IPR protection, δ ∈ (0,δ(0)),
under which the long-term rate of growth is maximized.
The latter half of the proposition is conﬁrmed by noting that the rate of economic
growth given by (19) is positive if and only if δ ∈ (0,δ( 0 ) )a n dt h a ti ti sc o n t i n u o u s
in δ.22
The proposition states that a growth-maximizing IPRs policy should be an inter-
mediate one under the assumption that leapfrogging is impossible. But how does the
result depend on the assumption? The next section investigates the general case in
which R&D can be conducted in both the competitive and the monopolistic sectors
and shows that the above result continues to hold under a certain condition.
4 Growth with imitation and leapfrogging
In this section, we dispense with Assumption 1 and examine the eﬀect of IPR pro-
t e c t i o no nt h el o n g - t e r mr a t eo fg r o w t hi na ne c o n o m yw h e r ei n n o v a t i o nc a no c c u r
in both the competitive and the monopolistic sectors. One complexity introduced in
this setting is that we need to keep track of the diﬀerent intensities of R&D between
the monopolistic sectors, mt, and the competitive sectors, nt. Nonetheless, the anal-
ysis can be kept tractable by focusing on a single variable, zt ≡ wt/βVt+1 > 0, which
represents the cost of R&D relative to the discounted value of innovation. The point
is that both intensities are functions only of zt; i.e., nt = N(zt)a n dmt = M(zt)
from (6) and (7). In addition, the probability that innovation occurs in a particular
sector, competitive or monopolistic, depends only on zt. Speciﬁcally, from (3) and
(5):
G(nt)=ntg(nt)=ztN(zt),H (mt)=mth(mt)=ztM(zt). (20)
22To more clearly conﬁrm the latter half of the proposition, note that the outﬂow from the
monopolistic sectors (imitation) must coincide with the inﬂow to the monopolistic sectors (inno-
vation) on the BGP. Speciﬁcally, using (9) and µt+1 = µt, equation (19) can be rewritten as:
γ∗
Y (δ)=( l n λ)δµ∗(δ). From Lemma 1, there is a level of δ ∈ (0,δ(0)) under which the ﬂow of
imitation, δµ∗(δ), is maximized.
21The ﬂow of innovation determines the number of monopolistic sectors in the long
run. Let z denote the long-run level of zt. Then, by substituting (20) for (9) and





δ(1 − zM(z)) + zN(z)
. (21)










L − (1 − µ∗(z,δ))N(z) − µ∗(z,δ)M(z)
for z>z (δ), (23)
where z(δ) ∈ (0,a) denotes the level of z at which the number of researchers, (1 −
µ∗(z,δ))N(z) − µ∗(z,δ)M(z), coincides with L.24
Equations (20)-(22) express the BGP of the economy in terms of z and δ.A s
z is an endogenous variable, its dependence on δ needs to be clariﬁed. From the
deﬁnition of z,i tm u s ts a t i s f ya ni d e n t i t y :
z = w
∗(z,δ)/βV
∗(z,δ) ≡ Z(z,δ). (24)
That is, the value of z on the BGP is determined as a ﬁxed point of function Z(z,δ).
The following lemma establishes the existence of the ﬁxed point and how it is aﬀected
by IPR policies.
Lemma 2. For every δ ∈ [0,1], there exists a ﬁxed point z>z (δ) that satisﬁes (24).
Suppose that the ﬁxed point is unique and let it be denoted by z∗(δ).T h e n ,z∗0(δ) > 0
23Here, we recycle the notation µ∗(·). Its deﬁnition diﬀers from µ∗(δ), as deﬁned in the previous
section.
24From the fact that N(z)a n dM(z) are weakly decreasing, it follows that the number of re-
searchers is weakly decreasing with respect to z. In addition, the latter approaches inﬁnity when
z → 0 and reaches zero when z = a. Therefore, z(δ) ∈ (0,a)i sw e l ld e ﬁned. It is obvious that z
cannot be smaller than z(δ) as otherwise the number of researchers exceeds the population.
22Figure 3: The degree of IPR protection and R&D activities. Calculated numerically by
setting λ =1 .5, β =0 .95, L =1 0 8,a n da =1 /L. Under these parameter values, δ(0) ≈ 0.28 and
zmin ≈ 0.11a.F u n c t i o nB(δ) is introduced in Section 5.




     
     
≥ a if δ ≥ δ(0);
∈ [b,a) if δ ∈ [δLF(b),δ(0));
<b if δ < δLF(b).
Function δLF(b) is zero for all b ≤ zmin, strictly increasing in b for all b ∈ (zmin,a),
and limb→a δLF(b)=δ(0).
Proof: see the Appendix.
Lemma 2 shows that, when stronger IPR protection reduces the rate of imitation,
δ, then the long-term level of zt ≡ wt/βVt+1 falls. Recall that the numbers of
researchers in the competitive sectors, nt = N(zt), and the monopolistic sectors,
mt = M(zt), are decreasing in z. Therefore, property z∗0(δ) > 0 means that stronger
IPR policies increase the number of researchers and, hence, the probability that
innovation occurs in every sector. In addition, Lemma 2 gives the degree of IPR
protection required to activate R&D in the competitive and monopolistic sectors (see
ﬁgure 3). As N(zt) > 0 if and only if zt <a , the lemma shows that protection must be
stronger than δ(0) in order to make researchers in competitive sectors willing to incur
23the cost of R&D. The degree of IPR protection must be even tighter (i.e., δ < δLF(b),
where δLF < δ(0)) to provide workers with suﬃcient incentives to participate in R&D
activities in the monopolistic sectors because mt > 0 if and only if zt <b(recall that
b<a ). In fact, the increasing property of δLF(b) means that the more diﬃcult
innovation is in the monopolistic sectors, the more stringent IPR protection must be
to activate R&D in those sectors.
To summarize, Lemma 2 states that tighter IPRs policies stimulate R&D in both
the competitive and the monopolistic sectors and that such policies are necessary for
leapfrogging to occur, particularly when leapfrogging is diﬃcult. However, we cannot
conclude from these ﬁndings that tighter IPRs policies enhance growth because IPRs
policies also aﬀect the composition of the economy, or, more speciﬁcally, the number
of monopolistic sectors in the economy. Ev e nw h e nI P Rp r o t e c t i o ni n c r e a s e st h e
number of researchers in both types of sectors, the aggregate research eﬀorts may
decline if IPR protection reduces the number of competitive sectors, in which more
research eﬀorts occur than in monopolistic sectors. In addition, with more researchers
in each competitive sector, the possibility of duplication rises and the eﬃciency of
R&D activities erodes.
To see the overall eﬀect more concretely, substitute (20), (21), and z = z∗(δ)i n t o
(12) and use the fact that wt is constant in the long run to represent the long-term












Equation (25) shows that the long-term rate of growth is proportional to the sum
of the leapfrogging ﬂow in the monopolistic sectors and the innovation ﬂow in the
competitive sectors. Note that, from (20), (21), and Lemma 2, both z∗(δ)M(z∗(δ))
and µ∗(z∗(δ),δ) are decreasing in δ,25 with M(z∗(δ)) > 0i fa n do n l yi fδ < δLF(b)
and µ∗(z∗(δ),δ) > 0i fa n do n l yi fδ < δ(0). Thus, the ﬂow of leapfrogging, given by
the ﬁrst term in (25), is decreasing in the probability of imitation δ for all δ < δLF(b)
25Note that, from (7) and(20), ztM(zt)=h(mt)mt = H(mt)=H(M(zt)). Thus, from H0(m) >
0, M0(z) < 0, and z∗0(δ) > 0, z∗(δ)M(z∗(δ)) ≡ H(M(z∗(δ))) is decreasing in δ.
24Panel 1: b =0 .8a. Panel 2: b =0 .4a.
Figure 4: Growth rate on the BGP as a function of δ. The parameters are λ =1 .5,
β =0 .95, L =1 0 8,a n da =1 /L (the same as in Figure 3).
and it shuts down when δ ≥ δLF(b). The ﬂow of leapfrogging is actually maximized
when the degree of IPR protection is most strict (δ =0 ) .T h eﬂow of innovation in
competitive sectors is represented by the second term on the RHS of (25). Note that
µ∗(z∗(δ),δ)=1i fδ = 0 from (21), and that N(z∗(δ)) = 0 whenever δ ≥ δ(0) from
Lemma 2. Thus, similarly to the case we saw in the previous section, the second term
is positive if and only if δ ∈ (0,δ(0)), and there is a value of δ inside that interval
that maximizes the ﬂow of innovation in the competitive sectors (which equals the
ﬂow of imitation in the long run).
These results imply the existence of a trade-oﬀ between these two types of in-
novation. In particular, imitation (and subsequent R&D in the competitive sectors)
vanishes if the ﬂow of leapfrogging is maximized by the most stringent IPRs policy.
Figure 4 shows the long-term rate of growth as a function of δ for two diﬀerent values
of b ∈ (zmin,a). When b is high, that is, when there is only a small diﬀerence in the
probability of success (or the expected cost of R&D) between the monopolistic and
the competitive sectors, the growth rate is maximized at δ =0 . T h i sm e a n st h a t
the economy need not rely on imitation to promote growth because the monopoly is
25not very harmful to R&D activities by outside researchers.26 Conversely, when the
probability of success in R&D in a monopolistic sector, b, is considerably small, the
ﬂow of leapfrogging is small even when IPR protection is strongest (δ =0 ) .I nt h i s
case, the economy may grow faster with weaker IPR protection, as weaker protection
maximizes the ﬂow of imitation. As shown by Figure 4, leapfrogging vanishes at the
growth-maximizing value of δ and, therefore, economic growth relies only on imita-
tion and the subsequent innovation in competitive sectors. The following proposition
summarizes these results.
Proposition 2. If the probability of successful leapfrogging is low (with b near zmin),
the long-term rate of growth is maximized by allowing a certain positive probability of
imitation, δ ∈ (0,δ(0)), so that the ﬂow of imitation is maximized. If the probability
of successful leapfrogging is high (with b near a), the long-term rate of growth is
maximized by shutting out any imitation, δ =0 ,s ot h a tt h eﬂow of leapfrogging is
maximized.
As stated in the proposition, the authority must choose between imitation and
leapfrogging, depending on the degree of diﬃculty of leapfrogging. The property
obtained in the previous section – that is, that the IPRs policy should be an in-
termediate one – continues to hold when leapfrogging is considerably diﬃcult. The
conventional wisdom that imitation is bad for growth applies to the case where
leapfrogging is nearly as easy as innovation in the competitive sectors.
However, note that such a dichotomy is possible because the ease of leapfrogging,
represented by parameter b, is given independently of the IPR protection. In reality,
the policy concerning IPR protection may have some eﬀects on the ease of leapfrog-
ging. Strengthening IPR protection limits the ability of outside researchers to use of
state-of-the-art technology in their attempts to create new production methods for
higher quality goods. Therefore, strengthening IPR protection reduces the degree of
26When δ = 0, the workings of our model are essentially the same as those of the standard
quality-ladder endogenous growth models without the possibility of imitation.
26ease with which outsiders can leapfrog the incumbents. Hence, if the authority im-
plements the strongest IPR protection to prevent imitation from arising, it inevitably
inhibits the innovative activities aiming at leapfrogging the existing monopolists. By
incorporating this trade-oﬀ into the model in the next section, we show that shut-
ting out all imitation is no longer the growth-maximizing policy even when there is
no diﬀerence in the technical diﬃculty of innovation between the monopolistic and
competitive sectors.
5A n e x t e n s i o n
So far it is assumed that the authority can directly control the probability of imi-
tation, δ. Suppose, instead, that the authority sets the breadth of IPR protection
so that it bans the production of imitated goods whenever the method of produc-
tion of those goods has a certain degree of similarity to the monopoly ﬁrm’s method
of production. By setting a broader IPR protection, the authority can reduce the
probability of imitated goods emerging. However, such policies may have a side
eﬀect on the possibility of leapfrogging in the monopolistic sectors; the production
method of the innovated goods may have some similarity to the incumbent’s produc-
tion method, and, therefore, when protection of the incumbent’s IPRs is wide, the
production of the innovated goods may be banned.27 This section presents a simple
extension of the model that incorporates this trade-oﬀ.
Suppose that, in each monopolistic sector and in each period, a method of imi-
tating the state-of-the-art good is found with a probability of δ0 > δ(0), and that the
similarity of this method to that involved in producing the good of the incumbent
27For simplicity, this section considers the degree of similarity in the technology or production
process used to produce goods, without explicitly considering the diﬀerence in the quality of out-
puts. Although it is outside the scope of this paper, some IPRs policies set the breadth of protection
in terms of quality (usually called lagging/leading breadth). O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004)
examined this issue in a quality-ladder model where increments of quality are determined endoge-
nously.
27ﬁrm is randomly drawn from a certain distribution. Let ² ≥ 0d e n o t et h ed i ﬀerence
in the production methods and FI(²) be its distribution function.28 The realization
of ² is independent across sectors and time. The authority chooses the breadth of
IPR protection, ² ∈ [0,∞), and bans the production of an imitated good whenever
² ≤ ². Then, the probability that the imitated goods appear in the market is given
by:
δ = δ0(1 − FI(²)). (26)
That is, by choosing an appropriate level of ², the authority can indirectly choose
any δ within [0,δ0].
In addition, the choice of ² aﬀects the ﬂow of leapfrogging. Suppose that, without
any protection of the incumbent ﬁrms’ technology, the probability of a researcher in a
monopolistic sector successfully innovating is b a, which is the same as the probability
of success for a researcher in a competitive sector. The new production technology
is partly dependent on the technology of the current incumbent ﬁrm and the degree
of similarity, ², is randomly chosen from distribution FL(²). When IPR protection
is introduced, any innovation that has ² smaller than ² is restricted29 and, therefore,
the probability that one researcher successfully leapfrogs falls to b b = b a(1 − FL(²)).
Recall that, when b a and b b are very small, they almost coincide with a ≡−ln(1 −b a)
and b ≡−ln(1 −b b). Thus, the above relationship can be approximated by:
b = a(1 − FL(²)). (27)
Equations (26) and (27) imply that stronger IPR protection (a larger ²) no longer
unambiguously facilitates R&D activities in monopolistic sectors. Although it in-
creases the reward for leapfrogging by extending the expected length of monopoly,
it also makes leapfrogging more diﬃcult. To see this tradeoﬀ more concretely, let us
28Function F(·)s a t i s ﬁes F(0) = 0, lim²→∞ F(²)=1a n dF 0(²) > 0 for all ² ∈ [0,∞).
29For simplicity, we rule out the possibility that the incumbent ﬁrm licenses the patent of its
technology to the successful innovator.
28Figure 5: Growth rate on the BGP with a trade-oﬀ between δ and b. In this numerical
example, we choose δ0 =0 .4, φL =3 ,a n dφI = 1. The remaining parameters are the same as in
Figure 3.
specify the distribution of ² by:
FI(²)=1− exp(−²/φI),F L(²)=1− exp(−²/φL), (28)
where φL > φI > 0. The realization of ² is distributed exponentially and parameter φL
represents the average degree of diﬀerence between an innovation and the incumbent
monopolist’s technology. The value of φL is assumed to be larger than φI because the
imitation tends to have more similarity to the original good than does the innovation.
By substituting (28) for (26) and (27), we obtain:
b = a(δ/δ0)
φI/φL ≡ B(δ), δ ∈ [0,δ0]. (29)
Equation (29) shows that b is an increasing and concave function of δ and that b =0
when δ = 0 (this relationship is depicted by the dashed curve in Figure 3).
The diﬃculty of leapfrogging, b,a ﬀects growth through the functions M(z),
µ∗(z,δ), and z∗(δ)( s e et h e i rd e ﬁnitions in equations 7, 21, and 24). Let us be
explicit about this dependence and write the functions as M(z;b), µ∗(z,δ;b), and














29from which the long-term rate of growth is calculated for each level of δ ∈ [0,δ0].
Similarly to (25), the ﬁr s tt e r mo f( 3 0 )r e p r e s e n t st h eﬂow of leapfrogging, whereas
the second term represents the ﬂow of innovation in the competitive sectors. Suppose
that protection is so stringent that imitation never occurs (i.e., ² = ∞ and, therefore,
δ = 0 from equation 26). In this case, the second term is zero because it coincides with
the ﬂow of imitation on the BGP. In addition, the ﬁrst term becomes zero because
M(z;B(0)) = M(z;0) = 0. That is, an excessively stringent IPR protection never
facilitates growth because it shuts down not only imitation but also leapfrogging,
resulting in zero growth. Suppose, conversely, that the IPRs policy is so loose (i.e.,
the breadth of protection is so narrow) that δ ≥ δ(0). Then, z∗(δ;B(δ)) <bfrom
L e m m a2 ,a n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,M(·)=N(·) = 0. This means that both terms of (30) are
zero.
These properties and the continuity of γ∗
Y(δ) with respect to δ, give the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. When the authority sets the breadth of IPR protection, ²,t h el o n g -
term rate of growth is maximized by setting a certain intermediate (not the widest)
breadth of protection so that the probability of imitation, implied by (26), is within
the interval (0,δ(0)).
Figure 5 presents a numerical example conﬁrming that the long-term rate of
economic growth is maximized with imperfect protection of IPRs. Observe from the
ﬁgure that, in our parameter values, both leapfrogging and imitation coexist under
the growth-maximizing level of δ. This implies that the authority does not necessarily
need to choose between leapfrogging and imitation as in the previous section; rather,
the growth-maximizing policy must ﬁnd an appropriate mix of these two engines of
growth by manipulating the degree of IPR protection.
306C o n c l u s i o n
In a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth, we have examined the extent to
which growth is facilitated by stronger IPR protection, which reduces the possibility
of imitation. The above analysis has shown that the most stringent IPRs policy
does not necessarily facilitate growth, and that, in most cases, the long-term rate of
growth is maximized with imperfect protection of IPRs. These results were obtained
by incorporating two notable features of R&D into the model: (i) for both informa-
tional and legal reasons, R&D is easier in competitive sectors where any ﬁrm can
produce state-of-the-art-goods than it is in monopolistic sectors where outsiders can-
not produce state-of-the-art-goods, and (ii) R&D projects take time to be completed,
which creates the risk of duplication of innovation.
Stronger IPR protection reduces the ﬂow of imitation and, eventually, the number
of competitive sectors. As a result, researchers are more concentrated in a smaller
number of competitive sectors where the probability of success is higher than in
monopolistic sectors. However, the narrower are the ﬁelds where R&D is carried
out intensively, the higher is the risk of duplication of innovation in each ﬁeld. This
makes R&D more ineﬃcient. In an extension of the model, we have shown that
stronger protection may reduce the ﬂow of leapfrogging by increasing the possibility
that innovations are restricted by the protection of existing IPRs. When protection
is initially too stringent, the sum of these two adverse eﬀects tends to exceed the
stimulating eﬀect that secure IPRs have on innovation. Given that this is the case,
our model predicts that loosening IPR protection will enhance growth in the long
run.
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P r o o fo fL e m m a1
We deﬁne f(µ,δ) ≡− δµ+( 1−µ)G(ψ(µ,δ)). Note that functions G(·)a n dψ(·)a r e
continuous from their deﬁnitions. This implies that function f(µ,δ)i sa l s oc o n t i n u -
ous. In addition, f(0,δ)=G(ψ(0,δ)) ≥ 0a n df(1,δ)=−δ ≤ 0f o ra n yδ ∈ [0,1].
Therefore, the intermediate value theorem shows that, for every δ ∈ [0,1], there exists
µ∗(δ) ∈ [0,1] such that f(µ∗(δ),δ) = 0. As (18) can be written as µt+1−µt = f(µt,δ),
µ∗(δ)i saﬁxed point of this system. As µ∗(δ) is assumed to be the unique ﬁxed point,
f(µ,δ) > 0h o l d sf o ra l lµ<µ ∗(δ)a n df(µ,δ) < 0h o l d sf o ra l lµ>µ ∗(δ), implying
that this system is globally stable.
To examine the properties of µ∗(δ), consider ﬁrst the case where δ < δ(0). Note
that, from (16), this implies δ < δ(µ) for all µ ∈ [0,1]. In this case, as we explained
in the text, there exists a positive value of n at which (15) holds with equality, and
this value of n decreases with δ.T h i sm e a n st h a tψ(µ,δ) > 0a n dψδ(µ,δ) < 0f o r
all µ ∈ [0,1]. As G(m) > 0a n dG0(m) < 0 whenever m>0, it turns out that
f(0,δ)=G(ψ(0,δ)) > 0a n dfδ(µ,δ)=−µ +( 1− µ)G0(ψ(µ,δ))ψδ(µ,δ) < 0f o ra l l
µ ∈ [0,1]. That is, the value of function f(·)a tµ = 0 is above the horizontal µ
axis, and the whole function f(·)s h i f t sd o w na sδ increases. Therefore, given that
f(·) intersects only once with the horizontal µ axis within µ ∈ [0,1], these properties
imply that the point of intersection is not at µ = 0 (hence, µ∗(δ) > 0) and that
this point moves leftward as δ increases (hence, µ∗0(δ) < 0). Second, when δ =0 ,
f(µ,0) = (1−µ)G(φ(µ,0)) > 0 for all µ<1, which means that µt converges to one.
Finally, when δ ≥ δ(0), we explained in the text that ψ(0,δ)=0 .A sG(0) = 0, this
means f(0,δ)=G(ψ(0,δ)) = 0, implying that µ∗(δ) = 0. This completes the proof.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
From (22) and (23), function Z(z,δ) is continuous and it satisﬁes the conditions that
limz→z(δ) Z(z,δ)−z = ∞−z(δ) > 0a n dl i m z→∞ Z(z,δ)−z =1 /(βV (δ)L)−∞< 0,
32where V (δ)i sd e ﬁned by (14). Thus, the intermediate value theorem guarantees
that for every δ ∈ [0,1], there is at least one level of z∗(δ) ∈ (z(δ),∞)s u c ht h a t
Z(z∗(δ),δ) − z∗(δ) = 0 holds, which is a ﬁxed point of (18). In addition, the as-
sumption that the ﬁxed point is unique means that Z(z,δ)−z cuts the horizontal z
axis from above and does so only once in z ∈ [z(δ),∞). Note that Zδ(z,δ) > 0f r o m
(21)-(24). Thus, the curve of Z(z,δ) − z shifts upward as δ increases. This implies
that the point of intersection moves rightward as δ increases: i.e., z∗0(δ) > 0.
Let us examine the condition under which z∗(δ) is smaller than a.N o t e t h a t ,
because Z(z,δ) − z cuts the horizontal z axis from above and does so only once,
the point of intersection (i.e., z∗(δ)) is smaller than a if and only if Z(a,δ) − a<0.
As Z(a,δ)=1 /(βV (δ)L) from (22) and (23), this condition is equivalent to δ <
1 − β−1 + aπL ≡ δ(0). Thus, z∗(δ) <aif and only if δ < δ(0).
Next, let us examine the condition under which z∗(δ)i ss m a l l e rt h a nb. Specif-
ically, we want to ﬁnd a threshold level δLF(b)s u c ht h a tz∗(δ) <bif and only if
δ < δLF(b), for a given level of b. Similarly to the above argument, z∗(δ) <bholds




δ +( 1− π)bN(b)
(1 − N(b)/L)δ + bN(b)
. (31)
When δ = 0, (31) implies that Z(b,0) = (1 − β)(1 − π)/(βπL) ≡ zmin.T h u s ,w h e n
b ≤ zmin, Z(b,δ) − b ≥ Z(b,0) − b ≥ 0h o l d sf o ra l lδ ∈ [0,1] because Z(b,δ)i s
increasing in δ. This means that z∗(δ) ≥ b for all δ ∈ [0,1] and, therefore, that
δLF(b)=0f o rb ≤ zmin.
N o w ,c o n s i d e rt h ec a s eo fb>z min.N o t et h a ti nt h i sc a s eZ(b,0)−b = zmin−b<0.
In addition, note that we have shown Z(a,δ(0))−a = 0, which implies Z(b,δ(0))−b>
0b e c a u s eb<a(recall that Z(z,δ(0))−z>0 cuts the horizontal z axis from above
and does so only once). Thus, from the continuity of Z(z,δ) − z with respect to δ,
the intermediate value theorem guarantees the existence of δLF(b) ∈ (0,δ(0)) such
that:
Z(b,δ
LF(b)) − b =0 . (32)
As Z(b,δ) is strictly increasing in δ, δLF(b) is uniquely determined and Z(b,δ)−b<0
33if and only if δ < δLF(b). Thus, z∗(δ) <bif and only if δ < δLF(b). The following
proves that δLF(b)i si n c r e a s i n gi nb for all b>z min. Let us choose arbitrary values
of b1 and b2 so that zmin <b 1 <b 2. From the deﬁnition of δLF(b)i n( 3 2 ) ,
Z(b1,δ
LF(b1);b1) − b1 =0=Z(b2,δ
LF(b2);b2) − b2, (33)
where we use expression Z(z,δ;b) to show explicitly the dependence of function
Z(z,δ)o nb.A sZ(z,δLF(b1);b1)−z intersects the horizontal z axis from above and
does so only once, the ﬁrst equation of (33) implies that Z(z,δLF(b1);b1)−z<0f o r
all z>b 1.T h u s ,f r o mb1 <b 2 and (33):
Z(b2,δ
LF(b1);b1) − b2 < 0=Z(b2,δ
LF(b2);b2) − b2. (34)
Note from (7) that M(z) = 0 whenever b ≤ z, which means that the value of function
Z(z,δ;b) does not depend on b whenever b ≤ z.T h u s ,w h e nz = b2 (which means




From (34) and (35), we obtain Z(b2,δLF(b1);b2) <Z (b2,δLF(b2);b2). As Zδ(z,δ;b) >
0, this implies that δLF(b1) < δLF(b2); i.e., δLF(b)i si n c r e a s i n gi nb.
Finally, we show the continuity of δLF(b) and its boundary property. As Z(b,δ;b)−
b is continuous in δ and b, δLF(b), as deﬁned by (32), is continuous for all b ∈ (zmin,a).
In addition, it is continuous at b = zmin because δLF(b) → 0a sb → zmin from
Z(zmin,0) − zmin = 0 (recall that δLF(b)=0f o ra l lb ≤ zmin). When b → a,
δLF(b) → δ(0) because Z(a,δ(0)) − a = 0. This completes the proof.
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